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301 
Recent Developments 
The Fairness Doctrine Redux: Media Bias and the 
Rights of Broadcasters 
Erik Ugland∗ 
Despite the ideological chasm that still divides Democrats 
and Republicans, members of both parties share a common 
conviction that the American mass media are biased against 
them.  While Republicans fulminate about “the liberal press,” 
the sinister agendas of National Public Radio, and the “CBS 
Evening News,” Democrats blast media consolidation, Fox 
News, and the conservative talk-radio juggernaut.1  This kind 
of media scapegoating is an enduring and generally harmless 
feature of American democracy.  But when political attacks on 
the media are coupled with calls for government regulation of 
media content, it becomes something more than a simple 
sideshow. 
Regulating media content—including news reporting—is 
precisely what some members of Congress are now proposing as 
a way to “restore fairness in broadcasting”2 and counteract the 
“proliferation of highly partisan networks, news outlets, and 
ownership groups.”3  The centerpiece of their campaign, 
featured in two House bills, is the resurrection of the Fairness 
Doctrine—the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
policy that from 1949 to 1987 compelled broadcasters to 
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 1. See, e.g., ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA? THE TRUTH ABOUT 
BIAS IN THE NEWS (2003); BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAS: A CBS INSIDER EXPOSES 
HOW THE MEDIA DISTORT THE NEWS (2003). 
 2. Media Ownership Reform Act, H.R. 3302, 109th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2005). 
 3. Fairness and Accountability in Broadcasting Act, H.R. 501, 109th 
Cong. § 2(4) (2005). 
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address issues of public importance and to air competing points 
of view on those issues.  The Fairness and Accountability in 
Broadcasting Act,4 introduced in February by Representative 
Louise Slaughter, would restore the Fairness Doctrine5 as well 
as the FCC’s old “ascertainment” policy,6 which required 
broadcasters to elicit feedback from their communities about 
the issues that they should cover.7  Another House bill, the 
Media Ownership Reform Act8 proposed by Representative 
Maurice Hinchey, would also reinstate the Fairness Doctrine,9 
although as just one piece of a broader effort to limit the size 
and influence of media conglomerates.10 
Both of these bills are currently in committee, and ideally, 
that is where they will stay.  Although it may be tempting for 
politicians to use their power to reign in perceived enemies, and 
although there is a vast, bipartisan constituency of citizen-
critics who would applaud the government’s exercise of greater 
control over the media, it is both impractical and 
unconstitutional to ask government officials to serve as arbiters 
of ethics in journalism. 
The old Fairness Doctrine forced the FCC to serve that 
role, and it was an abject policy failure, which is why the 
                                                          
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. § 2 (“Each broadcast station licensee shall, consistent with the 
purposes of this subsection, cover issues of importance to their local 
communities in a fair manner, taking into account the diverse interests and 
viewpoints in the local community.”). 
 6. See id. (“Each broadcast station licensee shall hold two public 
hearings each year in its community of license during the term of each license 
to ascertain the needs and interests of the communities they are licensed to 
serve.”). 
 7. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast 
Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).  The FCC freed radio broadcasters of these 
requirements in 1981. See Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).  It 
did the same for television broadcasters in 1984.  See Revision of 
Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, 
and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 33,588 (1984). 
 8. H.R. 3302, 109th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2005). 
 9. See id. § 3(a). 
 10. See id. § 4(a) (explaining that the bill would prevent a single company 
from owning more than five percent of the nation’s full-power radio stations 
and would also impose stronger limits on radio ownership within individual 
markets).  The bill would also codify many of the FCC’s existing limits on 
media ownership, thereby thwarting the Commission’s recent efforts to relax 
those restrictions.  See id. § 5(c). 
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Commission abandoned it in 1987.11  As the FCC explained, not 
only did the Fairness Doctrine permit “excessive and 
unnecessary intrusion into the editorial processes of broadcast 
journalists,”12 it was also self-defeating.  It rewarded 
broadcasters who eschewed controversial content and imperiled 
the licenses of those who did not.  The Fairness Doctrine was 
also irregularly enforced and was occasionally abused by 
politicians seeking to manipulate broadcast content.13 
Those seeking to establish a new Fairness Doctrine need to 
acknowledge this unpleasant record, and they need to offer a 
compelling regulatory rationale to justify such a wide-ranging 
usurpation of First Amendment rights. 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 
The first intimation of a “fairness” obligation on the part of 
broadcasters did not come from the FCC, but from its 
predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC).  In 1929, 
the FRC held that failing to address controversial issues and to 
present multiple points of view would “not be fair” and “would 
not be good service.”14  The policy remained somewhat formless 
until 1949 when the FCC outlined more plainly the twin 
obligations of broadcast licensees: (1) “to provide a reasonable 
amount of time for the presentation . . . of programs devoted to 
the discussion and consideration of public issues”15 (Prong 
One), and (2) “to encourage and implement the broadcast of all 
sides of controversial public issues”16 (Prong Two).  On several 
occasions the FCC reexamined and sought to clarify its 
                                                          
 11. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), reconsideration 
denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), review denied, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). 
 12. Id. at 5052. 
 13. See Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and 
Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of 
Broadcasting Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 190-194 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 
Fairness Report]. 
 14. See Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 F.R.C. 32, 33 (1929), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).  The 
Commission declared that the “public interest requires ample play for the free 
and fair competition of opposing views, and . . . the principle applies not only 
to addresses by political candidates but to all discussions of issues of public 
importance.”  Id. 
 15. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949). 
 16. Id. at 1251. 
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Fairness Doctrine policy,17 but it did not relax the requirements 
or question the legitimacy of their enforcement.  That changed 
in 1985 when the Commission engaged in a comprehensive 
inquiry into the Fairness Doctrine and concluded that the 
policy was unnecessary, counterproductive, and 
constitutionally suspect.18  The Commission did not 
immediately rescind the policy, however, because it was 
unclear whether it could do so without Congressional 
approval.19  A year later, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the FCC had the authority to unilaterally rescind the 
Fairness Doctrine,20 which it did in its 1987 Syracuse Peace 
Council decision.21  Since then, there have been two 
unsuccessful attempts by Congress to reinstate the Fairness 
Doctrine.22 
                                                          
 17. See, e.g., The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine 
and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 
(1974); Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial 
Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964). 
 18. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 13. 
 19. In some ways, it seemed that the Fairness Doctrine had been 
transformed from an FCC policy to a federal law by Congress’s 1959 
amendments to section 315 of the Communications Act.  That section defines 
the equal opportunity rule, stating that “[i]f any licensee shall permit any 
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a 
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such 
candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station.”  47 U.S.C. § 
315 (2000).  Section 315 also outlines some exceptions to this general rule, and 
adds that “[n]othing in [the exceptions] shall be construed as relieving 
broadcasters . . . from the obligation . . . to afford reasonable opportunity for 
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.” Id.  Some 
argued that this language essentially, if somewhat indirectly, codified the 
Fairness Doctrine, and therefore the FCC lacked the jurisdiction to rescind it.  
But see Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that this statutory language was merely an 
acknowledgement of the existence of the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine policy, not a 
codification of it), reh’g denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
482 U.S. 919 (1987).  This opened the door for the FCC to officially repeal the 
rules. 
 20. See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr., 801 F.2d at 518. 
 21. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), reconsideration 
denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), review denied, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).  Two related provisions, the personal attack 
rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (2000), and the political editorial rule, 47 C.F.R. § 
73.1930 (2000), both avoided this FCC scrutiny and remained in effect for 
another thirteen years.  But see Radio Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 
F.3d 269 (D.C.Cir. 2000) (holding that the FCC had not provided a sufficient 
evidentiary foundation to justify continued enforcement of the rules, and the 
rules were therefore suspended). 
 22. See H.R. 315, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 742, 100th Cong. (1987). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
Content-based restraints of speech and press are subject to 
strict scrutiny,23 the highest standard of constitutional review, 
and are nearly always held to violate the First Amendment.24  
Indeed, if the government extended the Fairness Doctrine 
requirements to communicators using any other medium—
print,25 cable,26 or Internet27—they would be struck down 
posthaste. 
However, because radio and television broadcasters still 
occupy a disfavored place in the courts’ First Amendment 
jurisprudence, Fairness Doctrine supporters see no 
constitutional obstacle.  They are emboldened by the Supreme 
Court’s 1969 decision in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,28 which 
upheld the constitutionality of the old Fairness Doctrine.  But 
supporters of the new Fairness Doctrine proposals do not 
acknowledge that the Court’s Red Lion framework, and indeed 
the FCC’s entire regime of broadcast regulation,29 is built upon 
                                                          
 23. The “strict scrutiny” standard requires that the government show that 
the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 
461 (1980)). 
 24. See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove 
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its messages, its ideas, its subject matter or its 
content.”). 
 25. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking 
down a content-based right-of-reply statute aimed at newspapers, resulting in 
substantial autonomy for the print media under the First Amendment). 
 26. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) 
(distinguishing cable from broadcast television regulation and holding that 
while content-neutral regulation of cable television should be analyzed under 
the intermediate rather than the strict scrutiny standard, content-based 
restrictions will still be analyzed using strict scrutiny), aff’d, 520 U.S. 180 
(1997). 
 27. See Reno v. ACLU, 512 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down regulation of 
indecent content on the Internet and providing protection for online speech 
equivalent to the protections afforded the print media). 
 28. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 29. Examples of broadcast regulations include: broadcasters must provide 
reasonable opportunities for political candidates to air advertising on their 
stations; they must give equal time to political candidates if their opponents 
are allowed use of that broadcast station; they must air three hours of 
programming each week that is designed to serve the educational interests of 
children; they must not air advertising for tobacco products; and they must not 
air content that is indecent.  For a general discussion of these requirements, 
see MASS MEDIA BUREAU, FCC, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING (1999),  
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the “scarcity rationale”—the archaic notion that the broadcast 
spectrum is a scarce resource, and should therefore be subject 
to governmental regulation to ensure the public interest is 
served. 
The Supreme Court first endorsed spectrum scarcity as a 
rationale for broadcast regulation at a time when television 
viewers were fortunate to receive three or four channels of 
programming.30  The broadcast landscape had not changed 
significantly by the time the Court decided Red Lion in 1969.  
But in the thirty-six years since then, television and radio 
technology has developed dramatically.  Today’s media 
marketplace bears almost no resemblance to the one the 
Supreme Court justices knew in the late 1960s.  Society’s 
dramatic movement from media scarcity to media abundance 
has eviscerated the factual predicates underlying Red Lion.  
Red Lion’s force started to decay in the mid-1980s when the 
FCC declared that scarcity was an untenable basis for 
broadcast regulation,31 and it has continued to weaken over the 
subsequent two decades. 
Some proponents of broadcast regulation make a 
distinction between numerical scarcity and allocational 
scarcity,32 arguing that even if there are sufficient broadcast 
licensees in a market to provide diverse programming, the 
electromagnetic spectrum is still a finite resource, so the 
government must choose who is allowed to use that resource.  
Although the spectrum is finite, it certainly does not 
necessitate or justify government micromanagement of private 
political speech.  Surely the FCC can address the technical 
dilemmas posed by finite spectrum without assuming the 
                                                          
available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/decdoc/public_and_broadcasting.html. 
 30. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (“The facilities of radio 
are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them.”). 
 31. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), reconsideration 
denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), review denied, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).  Here, the court stated:  
We no longer believer that there is scarcity in the number of 
broadcast outlets available to the public.  Regardless of this 
conclusion, however, we fail to see how the constitutional rights of 
broadcasters – and indeed the rights of the public to receive 
information unencumbered by government intrusion – can depend on 
the number of information outlets in particular markets. 
Id.  at 5054. 
 32. See id. (describing the difference between these two rationales and 
why neither is a sufficient basis for broadcast regulation). 
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editorial duties of a station manager or news director. 
This is not to say that the First Amendment completely 
prohibits FCC enforcement of public interest standards for 
broadcasters.  The FCC has a duty to ensure that spectrum 
space is not wasted by delinquent licensees.33  But content-
related judgments should only be made during the license 
renewal process, and the standard should be set so high—gross 
abuse—that broadcasters have the autonomy needed to make 
unorthodox programming choices.  For example, the FCC might 
be justified in denying a renewal request from a licensee whose 
programming lineup consisted of a single episode of “Leave it to 
Beaver” broadcast on a continuous loop.  But the same would 
not be true of a broadcaster whose programming challenged the 
precepts of a certain religion or addressed radical political 
philosophies. 
Proponents of broadcast regulation occasionally lean on a 
third rationale: because broadcasters use public property, the 
government has a right to attach public-service conditions to 
their license.34  There is nothing unique, however, about 
broadcasters’ use of public property.  All mass media use public 
property.  Newspapers use city sidewalks and public buildings 
for their news racks, and cable system operators and Internet 
service providers use public rights-of-way (public land and 
publicly owned telephone polls) to connect to subscribers.  Some 
non-broadcast media, such as satellite providers and wireless 
Webcasters, even use the electromagnetic spectrum, and yet 
they are free from the public-service obligations and content-
based regulatory burdens imposed upon broadcasters. 
The regulatory rationales that undergird broadcasters’ 
second-class status are no longer viable.  They are either 
specious on their face or their factual foundations have 
deteriorated to the point that they cannot be credibly applied.  
The whole regime of restrictions to which broadcasters are 
subject is ripe for a constitutional challenge.  But at the very 
least, the imposition of a new content-based law—even one 
motivated by a good-faith desire to ensure “fairness”—cannot 
be tolerated as a matter of policy and cannot stand as a matter 
of First Amendment law. 
                                                          
 33. See NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (“The facilities of radio . . . cannot be left to 
wasteful use without detriment to the public interest.”) 
 34. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2000) (explaining that broadcasters are obliged 
under the Communications Act of 1934 to serve the “public interest, 
convenience, and necessity”). 
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PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 
Setting aside the Fairness Doctrine’s constitutional 
imperfections, there are a number of practical problems that 
supporters of the Hinchey and Slaughter bills will also have to 
confront.  It should be made clear that neither of the two bills 
before Congress represents a reconceptualization of the old 
Fairness Doctrine.  No attempt is made to modify its purposes 
or application.  They simply call for a reactivation of the same 
policy that the FCC assailed, and ultimately repealed, two 
decades ago.  All of the problems identified by the FCC in its 
1985 Fairness Report and in its ruling in Syracuse Peace 
Council would persist today. 
One of the absurdities of the Fairness Doctrine is that it 
allows a group of political appointees to make delicate 
judgments about the fairness of news reporting.  Although the 
FCC is an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA), it is by no 
means nonpartisan.  Each of the five commissioners is 
appointed by the President, and each identifies with a political 
party.  The President also determines the balance of power on 
the Commission, with a three-member majority sharing the 
same political party as the President.  In addition, the FCC is 
heavily lobbied,35 and its policies have a significant influence 
on the political process.36 
Giving political appointees this kind of responsibility 
creates obvious risks of either unintended bias or overt abuse.  
Will commissioners be influenced by their own political 
affiliations and loyalties?  Will party leaders pressure them to 
rule a certain way on Fairness Doctrine appeals?  Will quid pro 
quo arrangements be made between elected officials and either 
broadcasters or FCC officials?  It would be easy for Fairness 
Doctrine supporters to dismiss these as hypothetical concerns, 
but there is a history of government intimidation of 
broadcasters that cannot be overlooked.37  In the 1970s, the 
                                                          
 35. See Bob Williams, Behind Closed Doors: Top Broadcasters Met 71 
Times with FCC Officials, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, May 29, 2003, 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=83 (discussing how 
FCC Chairman Michael Powell had said in a 2003 interview with CNBC that 
he believed the FCC was the second most heavily lobbied federal institution 
after the U.S. Congress). 
 36. For example, the FCC enforces the equal opportunity rule and the 
equal time rule of the Communications Act, which political candidates depend 
upon to reach voters with their messages.  47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000). 
 37. See RICHARD E. LABUNSKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER SIEGE: 
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Nixon Administration, often at the direction of Nixon himself,38 
sought to tame broadcasters by threatening nonrenewal of 
licenses or the imposition of sanctions by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission39 or the Justice Department.40  
Additionally, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations 
organized campaigns to flood broadcasters with complaints and 
demands for free air time in an attempt to force broadcasters to 
abandon their more right-wing programming.41  There are 
scores of other examples of this kind of pressure being put on 
broadcasters, who have always been more vulnerable to outside 
influence than their print counterparts.42 
Even without evidence of actual abuse, risks are still 
present.  As the FCC noted in its 1985 Fairness Report: “[T]he 
fairness doctrine provides governmental officials with the 
dangerous opportunity to abuse their position of power in an 
attempt either to stifle opinion with which they disagree or to 
coerce broadcasters to favor particular viewpoints which 
further partisan political objectives.”43  Because these dangers 
are not merely conceptual, because they implicate core First 
Amendment principles, and because they threaten the integrity 
of both journalism and the political process, it would be foolish 
to simply trust this matter to the good will of the FCC, 
particularly in today’s divisive political environment. 
Supporters of the Hinchey and Slaughter bills clearly put a 
lot of trust in the FCC’s ability to be fair and to resist outside 
                                                          
THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 134-37 (1981). 
 38. See David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications 
Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 247-51 (quoting an Oct. 17, 1969, memo for H.R. 
Haldeman from J.S. Magruder in which Magruder describes twenty-one 
instances in a thirty-day period in which President Nixon directed his staff to 
take action in response to unfair news coverage). 
 39. See LABUNSKI, supra note 37, at 135 (quoting White House Special 
Counsel Charles Colson as saying to CBS Vice-Chairman Frank Stanton, 
“We’ll bring you to your knees on Wall Street . . . .”). 
 40. See id. at 135-36 (noting that the Nixon Justice Department brought 
several suits against the networks for alleged violations of antitrust laws, 
most of which were “quickly dismissed” by the courts); see also Bazelon, supra 
note 38, at 248 (quoting H.R. Haldeman’s proposal that the White House use 
the IRS to investigate media companies and the antitrust laws to “investigate 
various media,” as he believed “[e]ven the possible threat of anti-trust action . . 
. would be effective in changing their views ”). 
 41. FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 40-42 (1976). 
 42. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT (1987). 
 43. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 13, at 192. 
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influence, but their biggest leap of faith is in believing that a 
new Fairness Doctrine will actually solve, or in any way 
alleviate, the problem of media bias.  Experience with the old 
Fairness Doctrine suggests otherwise. 
The old Fairness Doctrine did not enhance either the 
amount or the substantive balance of broadcast programming 
on public-affairs issues, and in many cases it encouraged 
broadcasters to avoid such content.44  In 1985, the FCC 
presented statements from dozens of broadcasters who 
concluded that the best way to elude an FCC enforcement 
proceeding was to simply abandon controversial content 
altogether.45  Because the FCC did not take any action against 
a broadcaster unless a member of the audience complained, and 
because most people were only motivated to complain when 
they perceived a violation of Prong Two (when a station fails to 
present all sides of controversial issues), the result was that 
broadcasters sanitized rather than expanded their content.  
The old Fairness Doctrine, then, was not merely unhelpful; it 
exacerbated the problems it was created to solve. 
Those problems would be writ large today.  Over the past 
few years, broadcasters have become accustomed to censoring 
themselves in the wake of the FCC’s confused crackdown on 
indecency,46 and they have edited or jettisoned scores of 
programs fearing that they might provoke FCC forfeiture 
proceedings.  ABC, for example, which has traditionally 
commemorated Veterans Day by airing an unedited version of 
the film “Saving Private Ryan,” abandoned that practice in 
                                                          
 44. See Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a 
“Chilling Effect”? Evidence from the Postregulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 279, 295-99 (1997) (noting that the amount of informational 
programming in radio increased substantially in the years following the 
Fairness Doctrine’s repeal, suggesting that the Fairness Doctrine had created 
a disincentive to produce such programming and that, once freed of those 
limitations, broadcast station owners would begin increasing that type of 
content). 
 45. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 13, at 169-88. 
 46. Recently the FCC has imposed significant fines against broadcasters 
in several high-profile cases.  It entered into a consent decree with Viacom for 
$3.5 million as punishment for the CBS Super Bowl halftime show in which 
Janet Jackson’s breast was exposed.  It also entered into a consent decree with 
Clear Channel for $1.75 million to settle several outstanding Notices of 
Apparent Liability (NALs).  And it has fined several other broadcasters as a 
result of indecent speech by media celebrities such as rock star Bono and 
shock jock Howard Stern.  See FCC, FCC Actions, 
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/Actions.html (last updated Oct. 13, 2005). 
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2005 because it worried that the film’s profanity might trigger 
FCC punishment.47  For similar reasons, PBS substantially 
edited its program, “A Company of Soldiers,” about the lives of 
troops in Iraq.48  These are just a couple of examples of the kind 
of collateral damage that a regime of content-based 
intervention can produce. 
As reluctant as broadcasters are to cross the line on 
indecency, they would likely be even more inhibited by 
punishments targeting political content.  Even in the absence of 
Fairness Doctrine penalties, broadcasters have shown an 
increasing wariness of programs and advertisements that could 
potentially antagonize half of the audience.  In 2004, for 
example, CBS rejected an ad from MoveOn.org to be run during 
the Super Bowl that criticized the Bush Administration’s tax 
cuts,49 several ABC affiliates refused to air an episode of 
“Nightline” in which anchor Ted Koppel read the names of 
American troops killed in Afghanistan and Iraq,50 and both 
NBC and CBS, along with many of their affiliates, rejected an 
ad from the United Church of Christ that contained a split-
second image of two men holding hands.51  More recently, 
several broadcasters refused to air an ad from famed antiwar 
protester Cindy Sheehan in which she urged President Bush to 
withdraw troops from Iraq.52 
Adding a new layer of FCC punishments would only 
encourage more editorial timidity.  Although on its face Prong 
                                                          
 47. See Lisa deMoraes, “Saving Private Ryan:” A New Casualty of the 
Indecency War, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2004, at C1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41464-2004Nov10.html. 
 48. See PBS, Frontline: A Company of Soldiers—Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/company/faqs/ (last 
updated Feb. 22, 2005) (explaining that although Frontline edited the 
program, it nevertheless believed that some of the strong language kept in the 
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During Super Bowl, MEDIACHANNEL.ORG, Jan. 16, 2004,  
http://www.mediachannel.org/views/dissector/affalert131.shtml. 
 50. See McCain Rebukes Sinclair ‘Nightline’ Decision, CNN.COM, April 30, 
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/TV/04/29/abc.nightline/. 
 51. See Lynn Neary, Some TV Networks Refuse to Run Church Ad, 
NPR.ORG, Dec. 2, 2004, 
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One—the “reasonable time” provision—might seem like a 
potential antidote to this problem, in practice it would be 
extremely difficult for a complainant or the FCC to make the 
case that a broadcast station’s programming is so devoid of 
public-affairs content that it should be fined or have its license 
revoked.  In fact, under the old Fairness Doctrine, only one 
broadcaster was ever punished under Prong One.53  The FCC 
would also be hard-pressed to establish sensible criteria for 
determining how much public-affairs programming is 
sufficient. 
An even greater challenge would be identifying standards 
for assessing the “fairness” of programming.  Would local 
newscasts be targeted for not presenting the viewpoints of 
foreign critics of the war in Iraq?  Would broadcasters 
televising presidential press conferences be expected to provide 
response time to representatives of other parties?  Would NBC 
affiliates be vulnerable for airing weekly episodes of “Will and 
Grace” without giving anti-gay bigots or Christian 
fundamentalists an opportunity to present their points of view 
about homosexuality?  These are not merely practical concerns; 
they have a constitutional dimension as well.  If the Fairness 
Doctrine requirements are so vague that broadcasters do not 
know how to stay within the bounds of the law, it violates their 
right to due process under the Fifth Amendment.54 
Another problem for broadcasters would be determining 
which viewpoints merit their attention.  Because it is 
impossible to air “all sides” of public issues, as is technically 
required by Prong Two, it is inevitable that broadcasters would 
seek to comply by clumsily matching liberal content with 
conservative content, pro-choice speech with pro-life speech, 
and so on.  The complexities of being truly inclusive would be 
abandoned in favor of a perfunctory presentation of the most 
simple and accessible dichotomies.  The Fairness Doctrine 
would reinforce the one-dimensional, red-blue template that 
has infected our political discourse, it would stamp out nuance, 
                                                          
 53. See Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976) (holding that a West Virginia radio 
station violated Prong One by refusing to air a congresswoman’s taped 
commentary on the hazards of strip-mining during a period when Congress 
was considering legislation on that practice). 
 54. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (stating that the 
vagueness of a law limiting online indecency was problematic as both a matter 
of First Amendment free press law and as a matter of Fifth Amendment due 
process law). 
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and it would give excessive weight to certain points of view by 
dividing every issue into equal halves.  One can imagine 
broadcasters diligently devoting equal time to pro and con 
perspectives on issues like global warming and evolution, even 
though most scientists believe in global warming and nearly 
every scientist subscribes to the theory of evolution.55  Although 
the Fairness Doctrine seems to recognize that some points of 
view are not worthy of equal attention, in practice it would be 
hard for broadcasters to resist this kind of feckless neutrality. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the supporters of the Hinchey and Slaughter bills 
ultimately prevail, they have at least chosen an opportune time 
to advance their cause.  With swelling public antipathy toward 
journalists and with forty-two percent of the public saying that 
the news media have “too much freedom,”56 the conditions are 
ideal for Congressional action.  This is a clear instance, 
however, where Congress must not slavishly march to the 
drumbeat of popular opinion and must instead protect the First 
and Fifth Amendment rights of broadcasters, while at the same 
time shielding the FCC from unnecessary administrative 
burdens. 
The constitutional and logistical issues raised by 
resurrecting the Fairness Doctrine are so abundant, and the 
potential gain—even in the most optimistic scenario—is so 
miniscule, that Congress should follow the FCC’s lead, 
recognize that it is both unconstitutional and impractical to 
legislatively direct the editorial choices of broadcasters, and let 
the Fairness Doctrine rest in peace. 
 
                                                          
     55.   See, e.g., Mike Fancher, Finding Agreement About Global Warming, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, available at 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002549334_fancher09.html; 
Stephen Jay Gould, Evolution as Fact and Theory, in HEN’S TEETH AND 
HORSE’S TOES 254 (1994), available at 
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/library/gould_fact-and-theory.html. 
 56. See FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
REPORT 24 (2004). 
